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The global usage of more sophisticated web-based application systems is obviously growing very rapidly. Major usage includes
the storing and transporting of sensitive data over the Internet. The growth has consequently opened up a serious need for more
secured network and application security protection devices. Security experts normally equip their databases with a large number
of signatures to help in the detection of known web-based threats. In reality, it is almost impossible to keep updating the database
with the newly identified web vulnerabilities. As such, new attacks are invisible.This research presents a novel approach of Intrusion
Detection System (IDS) in detecting unknown attacks on web servers using the Unified Intrusion Anomaly Detection (UIAD)
approach. The unified approach consists of three components (preprocessing, statistical analysis, and classification). Initially, the
process starts with the removal of irrelevant and redundant features using a novel hybrid feature selection method. Thereafter, the
process continues with the application of a statistical approach to identifying traffic abnormality.We performed Relative Percentage
Ratio (RPR) coupled with Euclidean Distance Analysis (EDA) and the Chebyshev Inequality Theorem (CIT) to calculate the
normality score and generate a finest threshold. Finally, Logitboost (LB) is employed alongside Random Forest (RF) as a weak
classifier, with the aim ofminimising the final false alarm rate.The experiment has demonstrated that our approach has successfully
identified unknown attacks with greater than a 95% detection rate and less than a 1% false alarm rate for both the DARPA 1999 and
the ISCX 2012 datasets.
1. Introduction
The continuous growth of Internet usage, development of
speedier Internet technology, and availability of massive
sensitive information have caused servers to be the primary
target of malicious attack. Lately, web-based applications and
web servers have become popular targets as most network
communication serves client-server enquiry needs. These
web applications are often accessible through ports that are
open through firewalls [1]. Although the Internet provides
convenient real-time information services to the public, the
potential threats to confidentiality, integrity, and availability
(CIA) need to be addressedmore effectively and permanently
[2]. To fortify the security aspects of web-based servers and
systems, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) can be used as
a complementary device to many existing security appliances
such as password authentication, firewalls, access control, and
vulnerability assessments.
The Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is an application
system or a device that identifies hostile activities or policy
violation activities within a network. IDSs have been widely
used in recent years as one of the network security compo-
nents.They play an active role in network surveillance, as well
as functioning as a network security guard. IDSs function
to capture and analyse traffic movement and precipitate an
alarm when there is an intrusive action detected. The alarm
is set to alert the security analyst to take the necessary action.
In general, IDSs can be designed either as a network-based
IDS (NIDS) or as a host-based IDS (HIDS) [3] to recognise
signs of intrusion. The design is based on the placement of
the IDS either to capture traffic for whole network or only for
a specific host [4]. In NIDSs, the IDS is normally installed
before and after the firewall to capture traffic for whole
network segment. With respect to the HIDS, the IDS focuses
on a specific host to examine packets, logs, and system calls.
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Such being the case, the HIDS is more suitable in identifying
internal attacks compared to the NIDS [5].
According to [6] there are two types of IDS:The Signature
Detection System (SDS) and the Anomaly Detection System
(ADS). In SDS, a set of previously defined rules are stored
inside databases specifically used to identify known attacks.
In view that SDS technique relies on consistent signature
updates, it is unable to detect unknown or new attacks [7].
Consequently, such attacks could pass through the system
undetected. On the other hand, the ADS approach is based
on analysis of normal behaviour traffic as the baseline of
general usage patterns. Fundamentally, ADS is based on
the assumption that any traffic that deviates from normal
patterns will be identified as malicious traffic [8]. The main
advantage of this approach is its ability to identify new or
unknown attacks. In spite of having such advantages, ADS
are overly keen to trigger massive false detection [9]. A false
detection occurs when the system misclassifies legitimate
traffic as malicious traffic and vice versa. The key factor in
ADS is developing a system that could produce high detection
accuracy while maintaining low false detection rates.
Therefore, this paper presents a novel Unified Intrusion
Anomaly Detection (UIAD) that consists of three compo-
nents (preprocessing, statistical analysis, and classification).
The study provides contributions through a new set of
techniques using 2-stage detection which aims to improve
the outlier detection rate and minimise the false alarm rate
in ADS environments. Initially, we performed hybrid feature
selection (HFS) to filter out the irrelevant and redundant
features. Secondly, the first-stage detection begins with sta-
tistical approaches, where the methods are further divided
into two phases: the learning phase and the detection phase.
Meanwhile, in the second-stage detection, the data mining
approach is employed, and in particular it uses ensemble
learning classification to improve the true detection rate
(True Positive and True Negative) and the misclassification
rate (False Positive and False Negative) that have first been
detected in the first stage. Finally, we implemented the
Logitboost algorithm as a metaclassifier with RF as a base
classifier. The result has demonstrated a significant improve-
ment regarding attack detection accuracy and a reduction in
the false alarm rate for both the DARPA 1999 and ISCX 2012
datasets.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Sections
2 and 3 review the related work and the datasets used by
this study, while the proposed approaches are explained in
Section 4.The experimental results are presented in Section 5.
Section 6 concludes and outlines future work.
2. Related Work
In this section, we discuss the related works on IDSs and
the existing work in the areas of feature selection, statistical
analysis, data mining algorithms, and web-attack traffic.
2.1. Feature Selection. Feature selection is a foundation of
machine learning and has been studied for many years [22].
It is a process of discovering the most prominent features for
the learning algorithm in the sense that the most useful data
is analysed for better future projection.Therefore, it is imper-
ative to extract the redundant or irrelevant features to provide
excellent discriminative models for every classifier. As the
effectiveness of the selected algorithm is highly dependent
on the feature selected, it is also crucial to choose the most
significant features that could contribute to maximising the
classification performances. Selecting the feature selection
algorithm often requires expert knowledge, as it is not a
straightforward task to identify a good set of features.
Currently, the two general methods used in this field are
the filter and wrapper [23] approaches. Filter-based subset
evaluation (FBSE) was introduced simply to overcome the
redundant feature issue inside filter-ranking [24]. It examines
the whole subset in a multivariate way. It selects the relevant
features and explores the degree of relationship between
them. In addition, FBSE is heuristic-based and involves prob-
abilities and statisticalmeasures to search for and evaluate the
usefulness of all identified features. On the other hand, the
wrapper-based subset evaluation (WBSE) uses a classifier to
estimate the worthiness of feature subset. Usually, WBSE has
better predictive accuracy compared to filters.This is because
the selection approach is optimised when evaluating each
feature subset with a particular classification algorithm.
Conversely, most of the time wrappers use a classification
algorithm to evaluate each set of features. This has made
it excessively expensive to execute. Moreover, when dealing
with a large database that consists of many features, [25]
the wrapper can become uncontrollable. Wrappers are also
highly associated with the classifier’s algorithm and that
makes it more difficult when shifting from one classifier to
another because the selection process needs total reinitiation.
Unlike filters, the selection criteria of features use distance
measures and correlation functions [26]. It does not require
reexecution for different learning classifiers. As such, its
execution is much faster than wrappers. Filters are suitable
in large database environments that contain many features.
Researchers have oftenused the filtermethod as an alternative
to the wrappermethod, since the latter is expensive and time-
consuming to run.
2.2. Statistics-Based Approaches. Statistical methods in IDSs
were first introduced by [27]. The detection approach pri-
marily relies on a collection of data history to create a
normal profile of behaviour. In this approach, only benign
traffic data collected over a period of time is utilised to
detect intrusion [27]. Some researchers have proposed a
statistical model in more specific areas such as Packet Header
AnomalyDetection (PHAD). In PHADpacket characteristics
and behaviours are used to recognise abnormal patterns.
PHADuses statisticalmeasurement from activity history [28]
to construct a normal profile. A set of traffic that deviates
from the normal profile and behaves abnormally would be
identified as an intruder by this method. Instead of using
IP addresses and port numbers, PHAD uses all information
inside a packet header [28]. The 33 attributes in a packet
header represent the information of 3 layers in theOSI 7-layer
model, which are the data link, network, and transport layers.
The information in the attributes is used to measure the
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probability of each packet being normal or tending towards
abnormal behaviour. The anomaly score is awarded when
there is any dissimilarity detected between training data and
the testing data. Finally, the sum anomaly score of each packet
is totalled up and flagged as anomalous if the score surpasses
the preset threshold.
In contrast to conventional PHAD systems, [29] pro-
posed the Protocol-based Packet Header Anomaly Detec-
tion (PbPHAD) in two different environments: network-
based and host-based. The proposed method used three
main protocols: the transmission control protocol (TCP), user
datagram protocol (UDP), and Internet control messaging
protocol (ICMP) to construct a normal profile that contains
normal behaviour. Similar to the traditional PHAD system,
this approach uses all 33 packet header attributes to produce
an anomaly score. The score will individually rate the degree
of incoming traffic. In spite of surpassing the results from
PHAD and DARPA best system [30] with a 57.83% detection
rate, there is still room for further improvement.
To identify whether malicious packets exist inside Telnet
traffic, [6] has proposed the Lightweight Network Intru-
sion Detection System (LNID). In LNID, benign behaviour
extracted from training data is used to construct a normal
profile. Additionally, the normal profile is used as the indi-
cator to compute an anomaly score. The anomaly score was
given during amatching process between testing and training
data. The packets are flagged as malicious when the score
surpassed the preset threshold. Insignificant features from
training data are removed during the preprocessing phase to
reduce computational cost. Although the scoring approach in
LNID has increased the detection rate for U2R and R2L to
86.4%, it still has the opportunity for further improvement.
The test has recorded nearly 14% of undetected attacks by
singly using anomaly scores to determine the threshold with-
out considering effective features as additional input. Profile
generation has attracted [15] to propose catastrophe and
equilibrium surface theory to extract common behaviours
that exist within the network. The standard equilibrium
surface is used to indicate the change of packet behaviour,
which makes it suitable for inspecting incoming traffic.
Despite the fact that the evaluation of true positives increased
to slightly over 86% for Telnet traffic, the real challenge is to
get the best detection rate together with the lowest false alarm
rate.
2.3. Data Mining Based Approaches. Data mining is the tech-
nique of discovering systematic data relationships and deter-
mining the fundamentals of data information [7]. Data
mining is divided into two broad categories: unsupervised
and supervised approaches. Clustering and classification are
examples of unsupervised and supervised algorithms, respec-
tively. In clustering, the group of objects are based on charac-
teristic data points, where every single data point in a cluster
is similar to thosewithin its cluster but is dissimilar to those in
a different cluster. It works by grouping similar data into one
or more clusters to ease abnormality identification. However,
this approach would potentially increase the false alarm rate.
In view of the fact that IDS performance is highly dependent
on its achieving a low false alarm rate, its capabilities would
be downgraded if it continuously generated a high false alarm
rate. For that reason, classification is the better approach
in classifying (i.e., benign or anomalous) data, especially in
reducing the false alarm rate. Classification is the supervised
approach that has the capability to differentiate unusual data
patterns, thus making it suitable for the identification of
new attack patterns [31]. Furthermore, classification has been
widely used due to its strong reliability in identifying normal
structure accurately, which contributes towards reducing
false detection [32].
The ensemble technique in classification has attracted
researchers to perform a combination of several classifiers
which aim to obtain better prediction on accuracy perfor-
mance [33]. The ensemble method is divided into 3 main
approaches: (i) bagging, (ii) stack generalisation, and (iii)
boosting. Bagging often referred to as “bootstrap aggre-
gating” functions to improve detection accuracy by fusing
the outputs of learned classifiers into a single prediction.
For instance, the RF algorithm achieves high classification
accuracy by fusing random decision trees using the bag-
ging technique. Stack generalisation, or stacking, basically
involves the combination of predictions from several learning
algorithms. The prediction output from base-level classifiers
is used to achieve high generalisation accuracy.
Boosting is mainly used to boost weak classifiers or weak
learners to achieve a higher accuracy classifier. In other
words, boosting can be considered ametalearning algorithm.
The incorrectly classified instances from the previous model
are used to build an ensemble. Weak classifiers such as
decision stumps that are based on a decision tree with a root
node and two leaf nodes are usually used in the boosting
technique [34]. Adaboost (Adaptive boosting) is the most
popular boosting algorithm which was first introduced by
[35]. The high accuracy achieved by using this algorithm has
attracted researchers [36–38] to employ this method in IDSs.
In [36], the author has proposed Adaboost, with a
decision stump as a weak classifier. The noise and outliers
existing inside the dataset are initially removed by training
the full data. The sample data that contained high weight is
considered as noise and as containing outliers. Although the
detection rate achieved was almost 92%, the false alarm rate
was still at 8.9%. Similarly in [20], the authors had proposed
CAGE (Cellular Genetic Programing) that used the evolve
combination function present in ensemble approaches. The
approach was tested on the ISCX dataset and achieved a
91.37% attack detection rate. Although the approach achieved
a high detection rate, the recorded high false alarm rate
constitutes a limit to the system’s capability.
In choosing the right weak classifier for Adaboost, [37]
has compared four classifiers NNge (Nonnested generalised
exemplars), JRip (Extended Repeated Incremental Pruning),
RIDOR (Ripple-Down Rule), and Decision Tables as a
base classifier for Adaboost. The proposed combination of
Adaboost with NNge received the highest detection rate in
detecting U2R and R2L types of attack while a combination
of Adaboost with Decision Tables was found to be efficient in
detecting DoS attack. Paper [38] has proposed a similar con-
cept to [36].The author has tested a Naı¨ve Bayes algorithm to
be used as weak classifier. Although the proposed algorithm
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could achieve a 100% detection rate for DoS attacks, the
overall performance (84% detection rate with 4.2% false
alarm rate) is still much lower compared to [36].
The introduction of the logistic-regression (Logitboost)
algorithm [39] as an alternative solution is to address the
drawback of Adaboost in handling noise and outliers. The
Logitboost algorithm uses a binomial log-likelihood that
changes the loss function linearly. In contrast, Adaboost uses
an exponential loss function that changes exponentially with
the classification error. This is the reason why Logitboost
turns out to be less sensitive to outliers and noise. To the best
of our knowledge, no research to date has investigated the
performance of the Logitboost algorithm in the field of ADS
environment.
2.4. Attack on Web Traffic. The exposure of vulnerable web-
based applications and their related sensitive information in
the Internet environment has promoted network security to
an area of major concern. This is because incidents of attack
are getting more frequent and aggressive, causing serious
damage to the targeted web-based information system. As
such, it is not surprising that more researchers are involved
in this field. Paper [40] has proposed a learning based
approach to secure web servers by focusing on detecting
SQL and Xpath injection attacks. The detection is based
on an input query where the attacker usually adds extra
conditions to the original SQL commands. The proposed
methods examine the structure and type of inputs as well
as the outputs of the operation existent in the XSD file.
After the necessary information is collected, the workload
generator is used to inspect the set of data accessing the
SQL/Xpath presented in the source code. In detection mode,
the SQL query is compared with the normal SQL query that
contains zero attacks stored in the lookup map. If the SQL
query is not found, the execution will stop processing the
query to avoid probable hazardous requests. This approach
is capable of alerting developers and service administra-
tors to stop the XPath/SQL injection before the system is
harmed.
The research proposed in [41] assumed that the attack
patterns commonly have a level of complexity that exceeds
normal access requests. This complexity is used as a bench-
mark in detecting attacks. The recorded request log is
inspected with Shannon entropy analysis, which is used
to calculate the complexity level. In defining entropy level,
normal log requests in training sets are used as benchmarks of
a legitimate profile. The boundaries (threshold) in detection
are measured using average and standard deviation of the
period for each entropy. Log requests that surpass the prede-
fined complexity threshold are flagged as potential intrusions.
Although the proposed attack detection approach is able to
detect attacks at a satisfactory rate, the false detection rate has
room for further improvement.
On the other hand, the work done by [42] has considered
the analysis on HTTP log requests. The normal HTTP
log requests have been used as training sets that could
describe the model of normal user behaviour. This approach
is similar to work from [43], where they make use of query
in detecting SQL attacks. Initially, the query trees would be
converted into dimensional vectors for feature extraction and
feature transformation. The work has been carried out using
the data mining technique and utilise the Support Vector
Machines (SVM) algorithm for classification purposes. The
result has demonstrated conspicuous performance improve-
ment in terms of computational time reduction and attack
detection accuracy rates. Although the detection rate presents
a significant improvement, the proposed methods require a
readable payload to extract the http request.
Traditionally, IDS works with the principle of “deep
packet inspection”where the packet payloads are inspected to
look for the presence of malicious activities. As the usage of
network communications gets more frequent, the demands
for more secured communication using cryptography also
increase. In encrypted traffic environments, secure sockets
layer (SSL),wired equivalent privacyWEP, or Internet protocol
security (IPsec) protocols are utilised to offer better privacy
and confidentiality. Previous work in detecting web-based
attacks mainly focused on investigating the log/payload
content [44, 45]. In view that the traffic is encrypted, payload
(log) is unavailable as the content is indecipherable. Unlike
payload, the information set of the packet header is still
accessible for extrication. Packet headers were used in this
research due to the availability of information even in
encrypted traffic situations. Thus, this approach is applicable
in detecting malicious attacks within the encrypted network
traffic.
3. Dataset Description
The proposed method was experimented using two different
datasets: the DARPA 1999 [30] and the ISCX 2012 [46]
datasets. We made use of a publicly available labelled dataset
simply to avoid the problems described in [47] with recorded
traffic from the real environment. Both datasets are available
online and have been comprehensively used as a standard
benchmark by many researchers in this field, for example,
by [6, 15, 16, 48]. The DARPA 1999 dataset is traditional
and commonly used in this field. Basically, the dataset is an
improved version of theDefence Advanced Research Projects
Agency (DARPA) 1998 initiative updated with additional
types of attack. In contrast, the ISCX 2012 dataset is a
modern updated dataset, which is claimed to have rectified
the weaknesses identified in DARPA 1999.
3.1. DARPA 1999. MIT Lincoln Lab has provided a publicly
available dataset called DARPA 1999. The dataset consists
of traffic data spanning a total of 5 weeks, with 3 weeks of
training and 2weeks of testing data. In view of itsmultiformat
datasets, we choose tcpdump since it contains comprehensive
TCP/IP information that is good for traffic analysis. In
training data, traffic fromweeks 2 and 3was defined as benign
traffic as it is free from attack. Thus, it is suitable to use the
data to train ADS. For testing data, weeks 4 and 5 contain
attacks that were generated in the middle of benign traffic.
The distributions of the attacks are different for week 4 and
for week 5. In week 5, the data containsmore attacks that were
not present in week 4. The different attack distribution is an
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Figure 1: Diagram of 1999 test bed simulation [30].
opportunity for researchers to seek methods that can be used
to detect new or novel attacks.
Figure 1 shows the dataset generation simulation based
on a scripting technique generating live benign and attack
traffic. The scenario is equivalent to flowing traffic from
the internal Eyrie Air Force Base to the Internet at large.
The test bed generates rich background traffic to simulate
the initialisation of traffic, as if the traffic was initiated by
thousands of hosts from hundreds of users. All attacks were
set to automatically launch against victim machines (UNIX
OS) and the external host’s router. The sensor known as
“sniffer” was placed within the internal and external network
to capture all traffic broadcasted through the network.
3.2. ISCX 2012. This dataset was generated by [46] from the
University of Brunswick (UNB) and aimed to address is-
sues in other existing datasets such as DARPA, CAIDA, and
DEFCON. The 7-day simulation dataset consists of 3 days of
attack-free traffic and 4 days of mixed benign and malign
traffic. The distribution model profile concept is the basis
of the dataset effectiveness in realism, evaluation, malicious
activity, and capabilities. Numerous multiphase attack events
were induced to create the anomaly trace to the dataset such
as HTTPDenial of Service (DoS), Botnet, Distributed Denial
of Service (DDoS), and Brute Force SSH.The simulation was
created to simulate and mimic user behaviour activity. Pro-
file-based user behaviour was created by executing a user-
profile that synthetically generates at random synchronized
times. The dataset came with labelled traffic that could
assist the researcher for testing, comparison, and evaluation
purposes.
Figure 2 shows the ISCX 2012 test bed network that
contains 21 interconnected Windows workstations. Those
workstations were equipped with Windows operating sys-
tems as a platform to launch attacks against the test bed
environment. Out of 21, 17 workstations were installed with
Windows XP SP1, 2 with SP2, 1 with SP3, and the rest with
Windows 7.The network architecture divides the workstation
into four distinct LANs. This configuration was expected
to represent a real connectivity network environment. The
servers located at the fifth LAN provide web, email, DNS, and
Network Address Translation (NAT) services.
The NAT server (192.168.5.124) was placed at the entry
point of the network so that the firewall would only allow
authorised access. The primary main server (192.168.5.122)
was accountable for email services, delivering website and
performing as an internal name resolver. The secondary
server (192.168.5.123) was made responsible for handling
internal ASP.NET applications that sit on Windows Server
2003 machines. Both main and NAT servers were run on
Linux operating systems and configured with Ubuntu 10.04.
Our experiment was focused on the specific host server
addresses DARPA (172.016.114.050) and ISCX (192.168.5.122).
These two hosts were chosen due to their having the highest
attack traffic content.
4. Methodology
In this research, our anomaly detection approach consists in
three parts: preprocessing (hybrid feature selection), statis-
tical analysis (benign behaviour analysis), and data mining
(boosting classification algorithm).
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Figure 2: ISCX 2012 test bed network architecture [46].
4.1. Preprocessing. In the preprocessing step, we adopted our
previous HFS [49] approach to leverage the strengths of
both the filter and wrapper approaches. In addition, the
proposed filter-based subset evaluation (FBSE) was utilised
to resolve the drawback in filter-ranking where redundant
features exist.
Figure 3 shows the process flows for building HFS, which
can be classified into 3 phases as follows.
In Stage 1, the process starts with the filter-subset eval-
uation. It processes the original features M and produces
a new set L of reduced features, where 𝐿 ⊆ 𝑀. We
proposed the Correlation Feature Selection (CFS) approach
due to its robustness in removing redundant and irrelevant
features. This approach prevails to overcome the existence
of redundant features, as in CFS the relationship between
features is measured as in (1). In addition, in feature ranking,
the reduced features are usually defined without the need to
perform further examination (information gain, gain ration).
The CFS is an intelligible filter algorithm that evaluates
subsets of features based on a heuristic evaluation function.
The evaluation is based on the hypothesis “A good feature
subset is one that contains features highly correlated with the
class, yet uncorrelated with each other” [25].
𝑀𝑠 = 𝑘 rcf√𝑘 + 𝑘 (𝑘 − 1) rff . (1)
Equation (1) shows how the merit, 𝑀, is used to select
subset s containing 𝑘 number of features. Both redundant
and irrelevant features are determined by the rcf , which
represents the mean of the relationship of each feature to its
class while the rff is the mean of the relationship among the
features.The exhaustive search is not suitable in large datasets
[25] due to its high complexity. As such, we used heuristic
search techniques and chose a genetic algorithm as the search
function. This was because our experiment reveals that the
genetic algorithm gives a global optimum solution and is
more robust compared to the best-first and greedy methods.
Furthermore, at this stage it is crucial to help to truncate the
computational effort using the wrapper approach as it only
deals with a reduced set of features compared to the original
set of features.
In Stage 2, the reduced feature set L gathered from the
FBSE was further processed by WBSE to produce the final
set of optimal features K, where 𝐾 ⊆ 𝐿 ⊆ 𝑀. The proposed
filter and wrapper hybridisation approaches would leverage
both of their strengths to produce a much better result in
terms of accuracy, false alarm rate, and fewer redundant and
irrelevant features. This was due to the fact that the filter
approach could not find the best available subset, as it is less
dependent on the classifier. On the other hand, the wrapper
approach is proven to be more effective and produced better
accuracy. Nevertheless, it is computationally expensive when
dealing with a large dataset.Thus, by leveraging the strengths
of both methods, we had combined both methods together
to form a hybrid feature selection (HFS) approach. We use
the Random Forest (RF) classifier in WBSE to evaluate the
selected features using genetic search and produced the final
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Figure 3: Hybrid feature selection (HFS) design [49].
K feature subset. The search would continue to train a new
model for each subset and will stop once the final optimum
subset is found.
Stage 3 is called the classification stage. In this stage, the
final optimum subset 𝐾, produced by WBSE, was tested by
the RF classifier with 10-fold cross validation. RF consists
of many decision tree classifiers. Each decision tree was
constructed from the different original dataset samples. The
outputs were chosen based on votes obtained from each tree
that indicated the tree’s decision concerning the class object.
The most votes for the object are from the best individual
trees.
The RF algorithm is widely used in data mining tech-
niques for prediction, pattern recognition, and probability
estimation, as in [51–53].
Figure 4 presents the general architecture of RF. As RF
originates frommany decision trees, each tree of RF is grown
by a different sample of bootstrap using a decision tree as a
weak classifier. The vote is given by each tree to represent
the tree’s decision towards the class object. The forest will
choose the class with the majority vote of all over the trees.
Out-of-bag (OOB) error is used as validation during the tree
growth. It is described as the average of the classification
error connected to each tree𝑇𝑏 using the OOB𝑏 sample. After
constructing the forest, a new sample 𝑥𝑖 needs to be classified
according to following equation:
𝑐𝐵rf (𝑥𝑖) = majority vote {𝑐𝑏 (𝑥𝑖)}𝐵1 , (2)
where 𝑐𝑏(𝑥𝑖) is the class that is assigned by the tree 𝑇𝑏.
x
k1
k2
kn
· · ·４Ｌ？？1 ４Ｌ？？2 ４Ｌ？？n
Voting
k
Figure 4: A general architecture of a Random Forest [50].
4.2. Statistical Based Anomaly Detection (First-Stage Detec-
tion). Although some work has been done in the past
directed towards determining how to detect abnormalities
using header traffic, for example, [6, 28], this work does not
take into account the influences of packet size while analysing
benign and abnormal traffic. In our research, through statisti-
cal based anomaly detection (SBAD), we computed the attack
detection performance by calculating the traffic normality
alongside with standard profile and packet size.
4.2.1. Standard Profile. At bottom, the ADS is based on
the analysis of the normal behaviour detection model. The
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normal practice model examines the incoming traffic against
its standard normal behaviour to divulge any significant
irregular patterns. Using benign traffic rather than abnormal
behaviour as a profile was found to be more convenient,
as the intruder tends to employ certain evasion techniques.
In addition, to determine the difference between anomalous
and benign traffic, the probability of discrepancy traffic
was calculated using statistical techniques which assign an
anomaly score function. The basic idea of generating a
normal profile was proposed by Mahoney and Chan [28]
using a nonstationary model. The model is based on the
possibility of the event, depending on the time since it last
happened. The study made by Chen et al. [6] concluded that
the nonstationary model is not suitable to detecting attacks
which occurred on a different time scale. For instance, for
2 httptunnel attacks that shared the same traffic content 𝑇
and 𝑇󸀠, where 𝑇 occurred 1 s after the previous attack and𝑇󸀠 happened 30mins after the previous attack, both attacks
should share the same anomaly score due to the same packet
content. However, the difference on 𝑡 value of both attacks,
one with 𝑇 = 1 and the other with 𝑇󸀠 = 1800, has resulted
in different anomaly scores. The different anomaly scores for
both packets reflect the gap time that occurred between 𝑇
and 𝑇󸀠, resulting in an anomaly score for 𝑇󸀠 which is 1800
times greater than that for 𝑇. As both attacks shared the same
content, conveniently they should have the same anomaly
score. This approach will give effect when the threshold is
set to the certain level, where 𝑇 might be ignored after the
system detected 𝑇󸀠. To address these issues, Chen et al. [6]
have introduced stationary models that ignored the time
dependent scheme.
We adopted the idea of extracting distinct values from
attack-free traffic introduced byMahoney and Chan [28] and
stationary models proposed by [6], since such approaches
are able to demonstrate traffic characteristics efficiently.
Nevertheless, our approach is different, in so far as it does not
solely depend on normal profiles to determine malign traffic.
Our model can be seen as a unified system, which consists
of feature selection, statistical, and data mining approaches.
Our research approach is different from [6, 28] in three
ways. Firstly, we eliminated superfluous and irrelevant fea-
tures using our proposed hybrid feature selection methods.
Secondly, we used a normal score conjunction with packet
size features to produce a better threshold mechanism. In
our research, we proposemeasuring the normal score instead
of calculating the anomaly score. The main reason for us
calculating the normal score as an alternative to the anomaly
score proposed by [6, 28, 29] was because the latter is not
sensitive to considering the new value in an attribute. In [6],
our observation revealed that benign traffic is more likely to
have more novel value than malign traffic. Furthermore, in
the real environment, there is more benign traffic compared
to malign traffic. Thus, analysing the degree of normal field
value in the traffic is appropriate and easier compared to
doing so for attack traffic. Thirdly, we proposed 2-stage
detection strategy comprise of a statistical approach alongside
with Logitboost algorithm with the aim of reducing the
overall false detection rate. In our statistical approach, the
practice of treating normal traffic behaviour as a standard
Table 1: Standard profile (DARPA 1999).
𝑘 Features 𝑅𝑘 𝑁𝑘 log(𝑅𝑘/𝑁𝑘) ∗ 100
1 ethersize 235 53533 8.36
2 ethersourcehi 4 53533 14.63
3 ethersourcelo 5 53533 14.29
4 iplength 36736 53533 0.58
5 ipfragid 236 53533 8.35
6 ipsource 15 53533 12.59
7 tcpsourceport 5134 53533 3.61
8 tcpheaderlen 2 53533 15.69
9 tcpflag 5 53533 14.29
10 tcpwindowsize 382 53533 7.61
Total normality score 100
Table 2: Standard profile (ISCX 2012).
k Features 𝑅𝑘 𝑁𝑘 log(𝑅𝑘/𝑁𝑘) ∗ 100
1 totalSourceBytes 4032 25961 10.75
2 sourceTCPFlagDescription 14 25961 43.46
3 source 36 25961 38.00
4 sourcePort 6739 25961 7.79
Total normality score 100
profile has limited the system’s ability to recognise attack
behaviour. Thus, by implementing a classification approach
using datamining, additional derived features from statistical
procedures along with variation samples of malicious traffic
could define attack behaviour more precisely. As a result, the
detection accuracy andmisclassification ratewould be greatly
improved.
Figure 5 shows how the proposed ADS model is divided
into two phases. In the learning phase, we created a standard
profile as a benchmark to determine benign traffic charac-
teristics. The purpose of creating the profile was to identify
and calculate the degree of normality for the incoming web
traffic (benign ormalign). Normal scores were given for every
associate feature that was based on the procedure shown in
(3) while a standard profile is given in Tables 1 and 2.
We index attributes as 𝑘, where 𝑘 = 1, 2, 3, 4, . . . , 𝑛 and 𝑅𝑘
is a distinct accumulation of standard packet characteristics
while𝑁𝑘 is the total amount of traffic related to each attribute.
Normal Score = 𝑛∑
𝑘=1
𝑅𝑘𝑁𝑘 , 𝑘 = 1, 2, 3, . . . , 𝑛. (3)
Tables 1 and 2 illustrate the generic model of the standard
profile. The 𝑅 value represents a distinct value for each
attribute.Weuse a log ratio in ourmodel to calculate the score
as the 𝑅 value varies greatly. The normal score is calculated
based on distinct values divided by the total number of traffic(𝑅/𝑁). The proportion score is multiplied by 100 to get the
percentage values.
In the detection phase, the testing data contains amixture
of benign and malign traffic. As can be seen in Figure 6, the
web-based traffic within the testing dataset wasmatched with
the standard profile.We incorporated the scores derived from
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Figure 5: Proposed unified anomaly IDS.
the standard profile into the test dataset. All values within the
test dataset were examined very closely. If their unique values
are matched with the profile, a normal score will be awarded.
However, if the test dataset values are absent in the standard
profile, a zero score will be given to the particular attributes.
During the matching procedure, two scores, namely, the
Passive Score (PS) and the Active Score (AS), are produced.
PS is a fixed score obtained directly from the standard
profile, while AS is generated during the matching procedure
between the testing data and the standard profile.
Both scores collected during the detection phase (match-
ing process) were then converted into data points that
represent coordinates for distance measurement. Later, the
degree of normality is defined by calculating the distance
between the passive and active data points of the testing
dataset. Figure 7 presents the example of normal traffic
behaviour when both the passive point and the active point
shared the same coordinates. In addition, Figure 8 presents
the example of anomaly traffic behaviour when active points
are separated from passive points and some outliers are
produced. To measure the distance between these two points
(benign and outliers), Euclidean Distance Analysis (EDA)
was used, given its adequacy in computing basic distances.
In this research, we make the assumption that anomalies will
occur when there is deviation between normal and abnormal
behaviour. Based on that assumption, we flag the possible
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Figure 7: Normal packet behaviour (DARPA 1999).
intrusion by calculating the distance between the two points
of training and testing data using Euclidean Distance. As
we implement the rigid assumption, the false detection is
expected to be huge. Thus further analysis using Chebyshev
Inequality is deployed to measure the upper bound for
threshold measurement that could improve the detection
performance. The EDA between passive and active data
points is computed as
Euclidean Distance = √(𝑋1 − 𝑋2)2 + (𝑌1 − 𝑌2)2. (4)
Thus, the distance between passive point and active point can
be simplified into
Distance𝑎𝑝 = √ 𝑛∑
𝑘=1
(𝑥𝑎 − 𝑥𝑝)2. (5)
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Figure 8: Anomaly packet behaviour (DARPA 1999).
In the next process, we had considered packet size as an
additional measure in conjunction with the standard profile.
The justification of choosing this feature is briefly explained
in the next subsection.
4.2.2. Influence of Packet Size on Traffic Behaviour. Previous
work [54–56] has proven that the packet size (bytes) can be
used to measure the traffic normality.This fact is validated by
the nature of a client-server input service request. Typically,
in client-server access, a client request would be comprised
of a small number of bytes. In return, the server will respond
with a large number of bytes. As such, a large number
of requests can be considered or suspected as abnormal
requests. Normally, when the user makes a request from
the same source address, the increase of the extracted string
packet size such as “get request” is minimal.
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For that reason, the inconsistent input size would trigger
anomaly activity. This normally happens when malicious
input is bound together in the legitimate traffic. For instance,
the XSS (one of the top web attacks) would target web pages
with an attempt to add malicious scripts to the website.
This activity requires more data that significantly exceeded
the size of the average parameter. With regard to the SQL
injection type of attack, the attacker’s input would include
malicious code to misdirect the program execution. The
code is in special strings that could alter the SQL statement
with the intention to compromise the intended database
files. Consequently, the malicious packets may contain up to
several thousand bytes. We therefore statistically measure the
packet size of the anomalous source traffic, which was first
flagged as anomalous using EDA.
4.2.3. Threshold. We deployed the Chebyshev Inequality
method to find the right boundary and determine the
finest threshold to achieve a higher detection rate. We have
considered anomalous source traffic and packet size as the
main features in defining the threshold. Figure 9 illustrates
an example of measuring the upper bound of training data
from the mean using Chebyshev Inequality.
From the previous anomalous source IP address, we
estimated themean and the standard deviation of their packet
size (bytes) distribution by determining the sample (mean
and variance) of each parameter size (𝑆1, 𝑆2, 𝑆3, . . . , 𝑆𝑛) for
both datasets during the learning phase (normal traffic). The
mean and the variance collected during the learning phase
were used to find the regularity in the detection phase. We
measured the probability of a packet becoming irregular
using Chebyshev Inequality as shown as follows:
𝑃 (󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨𝑥 − 𝜇󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨) ≥ 𝜏 ≤ 𝜎2𝜏2 . (6)
The advantage of using Chebyshev Inequality is that it does
not rely on the knowledge of how the data is distributed, as
in the real environment the traffic distribution could vary. It
places an upper bound on the possibility that the deviation
between the value of the random variables 𝑥 and 𝜇 is greater
than the threshold 𝜏 for randomdistributionwith variance𝜎2
and mean 𝜇. We changed the threshold 𝜏 with the difference
between the feature size S and the mean 𝜇 of the feature
size distribution. This will define the upper bound for the
probability that the feature size of a particular source IP
address deviates more from the mean when compared with
normal traffic. The probability value 𝑃(𝑆) for feature size S is
calculated as follows:
𝑃 (󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨𝑥 − 𝜇󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨) ≥ 󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨𝑆 − 𝜇󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨 ≤ 𝑃 (𝑆) = 𝜎2(𝑆 − 𝜇)2 . (7)
4.3. Boosting Classification Algorithm (Second-Stage Detec-
tion). In the previous stage, the combination of EDAandCIT
statistical approaches had demonstrated some attack detec-
tion performance (true positive) ability. However, when the
detection approach is solely dependent on normal behaviour
as a benchmark, massive false detection is produced. To
reduce the false detection rate, the data mining approach
is proposed. The main intention is to reexamine the traffic,
which has been predicted in binary form either as an
anomaly or normal. Furthermore, some additional features
such as predicted field, anomaly field, and normal fields
which are generated in the first stage are induced into data
mining techniques. The additional feature would improve
the discriminative power of the classification algorithm, thus
improving the detection capabilities and reducing the false
alarm rate. In the data mining approach, we propose to use
an ensemble technique named boosting algorithm that has the
potential to improve the detection accuracywhileminimising
the false alarm rate, as it is proven to be more efficient than
using a single algorithm [57].
In this research we use the boosting algorithm named
Logitboost as the metaclassifier for boosting classification.
From the literature, we found that this algorithm is more
suitable in handling noisy and outlier data compared to the
famousAdaboost algorithm.Consider a training data setwith𝑁 samples and divided into two classes (in this study the
two classes are abnormal and normal). The two classes are
defined as 𝑦 ∈ {−1, +1}; that is, samples in class 𝑦 = 1 are
normal trafficwhile𝑦 = −1 are the sample of attack traffic. Let
the set of training data be {(𝑥1, 𝑦1), . . . , (𝑥𝑖, 𝑦𝑖), . . . , (𝑥𝑛, 𝑦𝑛)},
where 𝑥𝑖 is the feature vector, and 𝑦𝑛 is the target class. The
Logitboost algorithm consists of the following steps [39]:
(1) Input data set𝑁 = {(𝑥1, 𝑦1), . . . , (𝑥𝑖, 𝑦𝑖), . . . , (𝑥𝑛, 𝑦𝑛)},
where 𝑥𝑖 ∈ 𝑋 and 𝑦𝑖 ∈ 𝑌 = {−1, +1}. Input number of
iterations𝐾.
(2) Initialise the weights 𝑤𝑖 = 1/𝑁, 𝑖 = 1, 2, . . . , 𝑁;
start committee function 𝐹(𝑥) = 0 and probabilities
estimates 𝑃(𝑥𝑖) = 1/2.
(3) Repeat for 𝑘 = 1, 2, . . . , 𝐾:
(a) Calculate the weights and working response
𝑤𝑖 = 𝑝 (𝑥𝑖) (1 − 𝑝 (𝑥𝑖)) , (8)
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𝑧𝑖 = 𝑦𝑖 − 𝑝 (𝑥𝑖)𝑝 (𝑥𝑖) (1 − 𝑝 (𝑥𝑖)) . (9)
(b) Fit the function 𝑓𝑘(𝑥) by a weighted least
squares regression of 𝑧𝑖 to 𝑥𝑖 using weights 𝑤𝑖.
In this research, we use Random Forest as weak
classifier to fit the data using weights 𝑤𝑖.
(c) Update
𝐹 (𝑥) ←󳨀 𝐹 (𝑥) + 12𝑓𝑘 (𝑥) ,
𝑝 (𝑥) ←󳨀 𝑒𝐹(𝑥)𝑒𝐹(𝑥) + 𝑒−𝐹(𝑥) .
(10)
(4) Output the classifier:
sign [𝐹 (𝑥)] = sign[ 𝐾∑
𝑘=1
𝑓𝑘 (𝑥)] . (11)
At this point, sign[𝐹(𝑥)] is a function that has two possible
output classes:
sign [𝐹 (𝑥)] = {{{
1, if 𝐹 (𝑥) < 0,
−1, if 𝐹 (𝑥) ≥ 0. (12)
One of the key factors exerting influence on the performance
of the boosting algorithm is the construction of the weak
classifier. The weak classifier 𝑓𝑘(𝑥) chosen in (8) should
be resistant to data overfitting and be able to manage data
reweighing. Based on the successful performance of Random
Forest (RF), we chose that algorithm as the weak classifier for
Logitboost classification.
5. Experiment and Results
The detection performance of the proposed unified approach
when applied to both the DARPA 1999 and the ISCX 2012
datasets is presented in this section.
The experimental results were obtained using theWaikato
Environment for Knowledge Analysis (WEKA) data mining
tools version 3.7 [58] and MySQL as a database management
system. Three main performance metrics were used in this
experiment to evaluate our proposed methods:
(a) False Alarm Rate (FAR). To quantify the amount of
benign traffic detected as malicious traffic.
(b) Detection Rate (DR). The proportion of detected
attacks among all attack data.
(c) Accuracy (ACC). Measured in percentage, where
instances are correctly predicted
False Alarm Rate (FAR) = (FP)(FP) + (TN) ,
Detection Rate (DR) = (TP)(TP) + (FN) ,
Accuracy (ACC) = (TP) + (TN)(TP) + (TN) + (FP) + (FN) .
(13)
Table 3: DARPA 1999 dataset.
Dataset Date Normal traffic Attack traffic
Training week 4
03/29/1999 8,998 728
03/30/1999 101 643
03/31/1999 5,202 456
04/01/1999 11,413 605
04/02/1999 0 0
04/03/1999 0 0
04/04/1999 0 0
Testing week 5
04/05/1999 6,632 723
04/06/1999 6,873 993
04/07/1999 5,800 1,807
04/08/1999 77,039 640
04/09/1999 0 8,073
04/10/1999 174 62
Total 136,962
Table 4: ISCX 2012 dataset.
Date Training data Testing data
Normal Attack Normal Attack
6/11/2010 0 0 0 0
6/12/2010 528 0 2,074 0
6/13/2010 0 84 0 108
6/14/2010 826 873 782 1,096
6/15/2010 1,468 2,757 1,973 27,125
6/16/2010 432 0 1,237 0
6/17/2010 1,032 0 562 0
Total 4,286 3,714 6,628 28,329
We use the publicly available DARPA 1999 and ISCX 2012
datasets that represent traditional and modern intrusion
datasets in evaluating ourmethods.The detail of the aforesaid
datasets can be found in [30, 46]. In the DARPA 1999 dataset,
the week 4 training data and week 5 testing data consist of
136,962 types of http traffic, as presented in Table 3. With
regard to the ISCX 2012 dataset, 8,000 unique instances of
http traffic were used in the training data while a total of
34,957 instances of http traffic were used in the testing data,
as showed in Table 4.
In the preprocessing phase, we employed the HFS
approach for both datasets to select the most prominent
features. Through this process, the original 33 DARPA 1999
and the original 11 ISCX 2012 features were reduced to 10 and
4, respectively, as shown in Tables 5 and 6. This significant
reduction of features has contributed to reducing the overall
computational costs in this experiment.
Thereafter, the process continues to statistically measure
the packet header with Euclidean Distance Analysis (EDA)
andChebyshev Inequalities.We used EDA to find the outliers
in the testing data by calculating the distance between testing
data and training data. In determining the finest threshold,
the upper bound was computed using the CIT method.
Table 7 shows the comparison results achieved in statistical
analysis for both datasets.
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Table 5: Feature selection for DARPA 1999 dataset.
Feature selection approach Number of features Feature selection
Original features 33 𝑓1, 𝑓2, 𝑓3, 𝑓4, 𝑓5, 𝑓6, 𝑓7, 𝑓8, 𝑓9, 𝑓10, 𝑓11, 𝑓12, 𝑓13, 𝑓14, 𝑓15, 𝑓16, 𝑓17, 𝑓18,𝑓19, 𝑓20, 𝑓21, 𝑓22𝑓23, 𝑓24, 𝑓25, 𝑓26, 𝑓27, 𝑓28, 𝑓29, 𝑓30, 𝑓31, 𝑓32, 𝑓33
Reduced features (hybrid
feature selection) 10 𝑓1, 𝑓4, 𝑓5, 𝑓9, 𝑓10, 𝑓16, 𝑓20, 𝑓24, 𝑓25, 𝑓26
Table 6: Feature selection for ISCX 2012 dataset.
Feature selection approach Number of features Feature selection
Original features 11 𝑓1, 𝑓2, 𝑓3, 𝑓4, 𝑓5, 𝑓6, 𝑓7, 𝑓8, 𝑓9, 𝑓10, 𝑓11
Reduced features (hybrid feature selection) 4 𝑓2, 𝑓3, 𝑓9, 𝑓11
Table 7: Comparison between SBAD and unified approach.
Dataset Method False alarm rate Detection rate Accuracy
DARPA 1999 Statistical based anomaly detection (SBAD) 5.10% 75.20% 92.67%
Unified Intrusion Anomaly Detection (UIAD) 0.13% 95.84% 99.41%
ISCX 2012 Statistical based anomaly detection (SBAD) 3.50% 99.81% 99.18%
Unified Intrusion Anomaly Detection (UIAD) 0.08% 99.66% 99.71%
By implementing SBAD alone, the approach was seen
to generate a number of false alarm rates. Upon closer
investigation, we found that the false detection was derived
frommasquerade traffic where benign traffic shared the same
behaviour with malign traffic and vice versa. Thus, the data
mining technique particularly using a boosting algorithm
classification is employed as a compliment to the SBAD to
reduce the inaccurate classification rate.
Table 7 presents a data performance comparison between
SBAD and the proposed unified approach. The result shows
that the proposed UIAD had outperformed SBAD in terms
of FAR, DR, and ACC. This has indicated that the anomaly
detection components in the second stage are a good comple-
ment for attack detection in first stage. The implementation
of 2-stage detection has significantly reduces the false alarm
rate from 5.1% and 3.5% to 0.13% and 0.08% for both datasets,
respectively. Although the detection rate of SBAD in the
ISCX 2012 dataset is slightly better by 0.15%, in terms of
the overall accuracy produced, the performance of UIAD is
slightly ahead by 0.53%, along with a more than 43 times
reduction of false alarm rate compared to SBAD.
To test the robustness of our proposed unified approach,
we ensured that the attack traffic in both training and testing
data was significantly different. In simple terms, this mean
that the sample attack traffic used in the training data is not
itself part of the testing data. In addition, we made sure that
the proportion of attack traffic in the training data was less
than the attack traffic in the testing dataset. For example, in
this research 2,432 and 3,714 amounts of attack traffic were
used in the training data to build the classification model
while 12,298 and 28,329 amounts of attack traffic are available
for detection in the DARPA 1999 and ISCX 2012 testing sets,
respectively.
Table 8 lists 6 types of attack available in both weeks 4
and 5 from the DARPA 1999 dataset. The 4 types of attack
existed in week 4 (training dataset) were back, ipsweep, perl,
and phf. Subsequently on week 5 (testing dataset), 5 types of
attack, back, ipsweep, and perl plus two new attacks named
secret and tcpreset, were identified. Our unified approach
successfully recognised 95.84% of attack instances in the
testing dataset. The attack types with the highest detection
rate are U2R (100.00%) and DATA (100%), followed by DoS
(75.71%), and the lowest is the PROBE (67.56%). Upon closer
analysis, we noticed that the poor performance of PROBE
was due to the nature of the attack itself, which shares similar
characteristics with normal traffic behaviour. As the nature
of PROBE attacks is to gather system information and to
discover known vulnerabilities, the relevant kind of traffic
seems to be legitimate and is mostly classified as normal
by the system. With regard to the DoS attack type, the low
detection percentage of “back” attack was caused by the lack
of samples available in the training dataset.The sample was 52
times smaller than the attack in the testing dataset. It is worth
mentioning that our proposed unified approach successfully
identified 2 new attacks name “tcpreset” and “secret” that
were only present in the testing dataset, which indicated
that our proposed unified approach is capable of detecting
unknown attacks.
In the ISCX 2012 dataset, the attack class is represented
in binary form (0, 1) either as normal or attack traffic. Thus,
the analysis on the specific attack type in the dataset is not
possible. As shown in Table 9, with a limited number of
attacks available in training dataset, the system successfully
recognises almost all the attacks in the testing dataset, with a
99.66% detection rate.
Tables 10 and 11 show the performance of our proposed
unified model in terms of FAR, DR, and ACC compared
to the previous methods tested on the DARPA 1999 and
ISCX 2012 datasets. It should be noted that the comparisons
are for reference only due to many researchers having used
different proportions of traffic types, sampling methods, and
preprocessing techniques. Although our proposed approach
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Table 8: Detection result derived by unified approach for DARPA 1999 testing dataset.
Attack category Attack name Attack traffic intraining dataset
Attack traffic in
testing dataset
Attack traffic detected
by unified approach
% age of detected
attack traffic
DoS back 25 1,300 983 75.71%
tcpreset — 5 5
PROBE ipsweep 106 598 404 67.56%
U2R perl 1,677 10,333 10,333 100%
R2L phf 624 — — —
DATA (New) secret — 62 62 100%
Total — 2,432 12,298 11,787 —
Table 9: Detection result derived by unified approach for ISCX 2012
testing set.
Attack traffic
in training
dataset
Attack traffic
in testing
dataset
Attack traffic
detected by
unified
approach
% age of detected
attack traffic
3,714 28,329 28,234 99.66%
had achieved better performance in most of the cases, it
cannot be claimed that the proposed method outperformed
others. Nevertheless, our proposed approach has shown some
detection ability with a robust performance in detecting
unknown attack traffic.
In addition, it should be noted that we evaluated the
performance of the proposed approach with some eminent
state-of-the-art data mining algorithms used in IDS. Tables
12 and 13 display a comparison of performance metrics
between our proposed approach and seven other datamining
algorithms previously used by researchers in IDSs, including
Na¨ıve Bayes [59], Support Vector Machine [60], Multilayer
Perceptron [61], Decision Table [62], Decision Tree [63],
Random Forest [64], and Adaboost [36].
To choose a better combination for the Logitboost clas-
sifier from a set of single classifiers in terms of accuracy,
detection rates, and false alarm rates, five single classifiers
are evaluated individually as illustrated in Figures 10 and 11.
This is a crucial aspect of our research because the algo-
rithm choices need to be further reclassified with ensemble
approaches for better detection performance. In the DARPA
1999 dataset, among five classifiers the accuracy, detection
rate, and false alarm rate shown by RF are comparable with
others. AlthoughMLPhad shown slightly better performance
compared to RF, the time taken to build a classificationmodel
by MLP is 84 times longer than RF. Meanwhile, in the ISCX
2012 dataset, RF outperformed every single other classifier
by achieving 99.68% detection accuracy. Thus, in our unified
detection approach, we had chosen RF to ensemble with the
Logitboost classifier for both the DARPA 1999 and ISCX 2012
datasets.
To compare the performance of the Adaboost ensemble
with RF and our unified approach, a further experiment
is performed as presented in Tables 12 and 13. Due to the
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Figure 10: Comparison of performance algorithms in DARPA 1999
dataset.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
N
aï
ve
 B
ay
es
Su
pp
or
t V
ec
to
r M
ac
hi
ne
M
ul
til
ay
er
 P
er
ce
pt
ro
n
D
ec
isi
on
 T
ab
le
D
ec
isi
on
 T
re
e
Ra
nd
om
 F
or
es
t
Ad
ab
oo
st 
+ 
Ra
nd
om
 F
or
es
t
Pr
op
os
ed
 U
ni
e
d 
D
et
ec
tio
n
Accuracy
Detection rate
False alarm rate
Figure 11: Comparison of performance algorithms in ISCX 2012
dataset.
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Table 10: Comparison of FAR, DR, and ACC obtained by the proposed method and other previous works in DARPA 1999 dataset.
Methods False alarm rate (%) Detection rate (%) Accuracy (%)
Improved IDS with fuzzy logic [10] 6.10 88.71 N/A
Lightweight IDS [6] 1.36 72.70 N/A
Ensemble neural classifier [11] 3.70 99.40 N/A
Sequential differentiate method [12] 3.38 100.00 N/A
Hybrid data mining [13] 2.75 97.25 N/A
Distribution IDS[14] N/A 96.00 N/A
Catastrophe theory [15] 3.38 87.39 N/A
Unified Intrusion Anomaly Detection (2017) 0.13 95.84 99.41
Table 11: Comparison of FAR, DR, and ACC obtained by the proposed method and other previous works in ISCX 2012 dataset.
Methods False alarm rate (%) Detection rate (%) Accuracy (%)
Packet Header Anomaly Detection [16] N/A 99.04 N/A
SVM anomaly detection [17] 1.36 72.70 N/A
Computer vision techniques [18] 3.70 99.40 N/A
Payload based anomaly detection [19] 3.38 100.00 N/A
Evolved specialized ensembles [20] N/A 91.37 N/A
Distributed SVM [21] 1.10 98.50 N/A
Unified Intrusion Anomaly Detection (2017) 0.08 99.66 99.71
high complexity of our proposed method, Table 12 indicated
that our proposed method took slightly longer in building
a classification model and attack detection compared to
Adaboost + RF. As a result, our method took 0.82 seconds
and 0.38 seconds longer than Adaboost + RF in building
and testing classification model. Although our proposed
method recorded higher computational complexity, over-
all performance that includes detection rate and overall
accuracy rate reveals that our proposed method has indi-
cated a better performance with 6.99% and 0.79% improve-
ment, respectively, over the Adaboost + RF in DARPA
1999.
Table 13 presents the performance of our unified pro-
posed approach on the ISCX 2012 dataset. Further compar-
ison between Adaboost and our proposed unified approach
has shown Adaboost performed slightly better in terms of
performance accuracy and detection rate, displaying 27% less
computational complexity in building classification model.
However, the false alarm rates obtained by Adaboost are
6.5 times worse than our proposed model. From the afore-
mentioned results, we conclude that our algorithm provides
comparable detection accuracy rate with a low false alarm
rate, which is the most crucial property of IDSs in practice.
6. Conclusion and Future Work
There were numerous anomaly intrusion detection studies
made in the past. Nevertheless, achieving exceptionally low
false alarm rates with high attack recognition capabilities for
unseen attacks still remains a major challenge. This paper
presented the novel Unified Intrusion Anomaly Detection
(UIAD) experiment results.The experiment synthesised both
statistical and data mining approaches to achieve better
results. The model consists of three major parts: preprocess-
ing, statistical measurements, and a boosting algorithm. The
UIAD was evaluated using two publicly available labelled
intrusion detection evaluation datasets (DARPA 1999 and
ISCX 2012) to allow different integration testing environ-
ments. Initially, in the preprocessing phase, redundant and
irrelevant featureswere filtered-out byHFS to obtain themost
prominent features. Following that, we deployed the EDAand
Chebyshev Inequalitymethods tomeasure and determine the
normality (benign or malicious) of the traffic characteristics.
We employed a data mining approach using the Logitboost
classifier algorithm to improve the overall detection accu-
racy while reducing the false alarm rate. The combination
detection of statistical analysis and data mining approaches
demonstrated a promisingly reliable rate of anomaly based
intrusion detection. Individually, the statistical approach was
capable of demonstrating some level of detection ability.
However, the better-synergised approach of statistical and
data mining approaches yielded better performance partic-
ularly in reducing the low false alarm rate below 1%. The
experimental results have demonstrated that our proposed
UIAD has achieved comparable performance with other
established state-of-the-art IDS algorithms. Moving forward,
the final successful results will be transformed into signatures
and stored in the blacklist database for future identification
proposes. We believe that detection time can be drastically
reduced, since the new entry traffic can be matched with
benign/malicious signatures generated from the previous
detection. Moreover, the proposed unified approach can
potentially be evaluated online using larger, as well as the
latest, encrypted sets of traffic.
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Table 12: Comparison between proposed methods with other seven algorithms in DARPA 1999 dataset.
Algorithms Model built(sec.)
Detection time
(sec.)
False alarm rate
(%)
Detection rate
(%)
Accuracy
(%)
Na¨ıve Bayes (NB) 0.53 0.42 0.15 85.06 98.18
Support Vector Machine (SVM) 158 142 0.22 82.78 97.86
Multilayer Perceptron (MLP) 135 1.2 0.083 89.29 98.72
Decision Table (DT) 0.85 0.61 0.15 33.85 92.39
Decision Tree (J48) 0.97 0.67 0.05 85.84 98.35
Random Forest (RF) 1.6 1.13 0.17 87.10 98.39
Adaboost + Random Forest (RF) 3.41 1.83 0.13 88.85 98.62
Unified Intrusion Anomaly Detection (2017) 4.23 2.21 0.13 95.84 99.41
Table 13: Comparison between proposed methods with other seven algorithms in ISCX 2012 dataset.
Algorithms Model built(sec.)
Detection
time (sec.)
False alarm
rate (%)
Detection
rate (%) Accuracy (%)
Na¨ıve Bayes (NB) 0.06 0.22 0.26 98.94 99.09
Support Vector Machine (SVM) 35.22 34.41 0.35 97.92 98.25
Multilayer Perceptron (MLP) 22.83 0.5 1.16 98.71 98.74
Decision Table (DT) 0.17 0.11 1.15 47.75 57.44
Decision Tree (J48) 0.08 0.13 0.26 98.96 99.10
Random Forest (RF) 0.28 0.26 0.11 99.63 99.68
Adaboost + Random Forest (RF) 1.84 1.58 0.51 99.82 99.75
Unified Intrusion Anomaly Detection (2017) 2.32 1.92 0.08 99.66 99.71
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